

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA  
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND PRACTICES COMMISSION**

**DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,  
Petitioner,**

v.

**CHRISTOPHER A. THOMPSON,  
Respondent.**

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**DOCKET NO. IS-2023-036**

**ORDER GRANTING THE DEPARTMENT’S REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE  
SUSPENSION**

This matter is before the Professional Standards and Practices Commission (Commission) on a Notice of Charges filed by the Department of Education (Department) and the response thereto filed by Christopher A. Thompson (Respondent).

Background

The Department initiated disciplinary proceedings against Respondent with the filing of a Notice of Charges on December 13, 2023. The Notice of Charges alleges that Respondent was criminally charged with Unlawful Contact with Minor-Sexual Offenses, Corruption of Minors-Defendant Age 18 or Above, and Indecent Assault-Person Less than 16 Years of Age. The Notice of Charges also alleges that Respondent poses a threat to the health, safety or welfare of students or other persons in a school and requests that the Commission issue an Order directing the Department to immediately suspend Respondent’s certificate and employment eligibility based upon the criminal charges.

On December 21, 2023, Respondent, through his counsel, Robert Daniels,

Esquire, timely filed an Answer and Demand for Hearing. On December 22, 2023, Scott P. Stedjan, Esquire entered his appearance on behalf of Respondent.

By letter dated December 26, 2023, the Commission appointed Chief Hearing Examiner Debra Sue Rand to act as hearing officer and directed her to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to certify the record without a proposed report in accordance with 1 Pa. Code § 35.201 (relating to certification of record without proposed report).

On January 3, 2024, the hearing officer issued an order scheduling an in-person evidentiary hearing for January 16, 2024.

On January 4, 2024, Samantha M. Laverty, Assistant Counsel, entered her appearance on behalf of the Department.

By Order dated January 11, 2024, the hearing officer granted the parties' joint request that the matter be heard by videoconference.

A videoconference hearing was held as scheduled on January 16, 2024, beginning at 9:30 a.m. Following the hearing, the hearing officer issued a Briefing Schedule Order. Both parties timely filed briefs. The Department filed a reply brief. The hearing officer issued an Order Certifying Record on February 22, 2024.

On March 5, 2024, the Commission convened a special meeting to hear oral argument. After careful consideration, the Commission voted to grant the Department's request for immediate suspension.

#### Findings of Fact

The Commission has carefully reviewed the record and makes the following findings of fact:

1. Respondent holds an Instructional II certificate in the area of Industrial

Arts/Technology Ed. K-12. PDE Ex. 2 at 4; PDE Ex. 3 at 2.

2. At all times relevant, Respondent was employed by the Donegal School District (District) as a woodshop teacher. PDE Ex. 2 at 4; PDE Ex. 3 at 2.
3. On Friday, March 10, 2023, Donegal High School Principal, John Haldeman, received an allegation involving Respondent and a student in Respondent's woodshop class. N.T. at 20. The allegation was that Respondent touched the student on the shoulder and then touched his buttocks. N.T. at 23.
4. The allegation was also reported to Lancaster County Children and Youth Services (CYS) and the local police. N.T. at 21.
5. Principal Haldeman met with Respondent on the morning of March 13, 2023, to discuss the allegation. Following the meeting, the superintendent placed Respondent on administrative leave while Principal Haldeman investigated further. N.T. 24, 26-7; Respondent Exhibit A at 1.
6. Principal Haldeman's investigation consisted of speaking only to adults. He did not interview any students. To his knowledge, no one interviewed the students who were in the classroom at the time of the alleged assault. N.T. at 22.
7. At the conclusion of Principal Haldeman's investigation, a letter was placed in Respondent's personnel file. The letter does not make any findings whatsoever related to Respondent's conduct. N.T. at 28; Respondent Exhibit A.
8. When asked about his findings, Principal Haldeman testified, "In my investigation, we had what [Respondent] reported and what the student reported, and their stories were different. So that's the information that we gathered from that event." N.T. at 23.

9. On March 16, 2023, Respondent was allowed to return to work, subject to the conditions outlined in a safety plan implemented by the District with CYS's approval. N.T. at 26-7. Under the safety plan, Respondent was to have no contact with the student and no unwanted physical contact with any student. The student was also removed from Respondent's classroom. N.T. at 27; Respondent Exhibit A at 1.
10. By letter dated May 4, 2023, the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services notified the District that the report of suspected child abuse investigated by CYS was "unfounded." N.T. at 23, 29; Respondent Exhibit B.
11. Principal Haldeman does not know what the CYS investigation consisted of. He only knows the report was unfounded. N.T. at 23.
12. The District left the safety plan in place after May 4, 2023. N.T. at 29-30.
13. Respondent continued working without incident until June 6, 2023, when the District learned that criminal charges would be filed related to the March 10, 2023, allegations, at which time Respondent was placed on paid administrative leave. N.T. at 30-1.
14. On or about July 25, 2023, Respondent was charged in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania with Unlawful Contact with Minor-Sexual Offenses, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1), Corruption of Minors-Defendant Age 18 or Above, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i), and Indecent Assault-Person Less than 16 Years of Age, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(8). PDE Ex. 1 at 3 and 4; N.T. at 11, 15.
15. According to the Affidavit of Probable Cause prepared by Detective Wilfredo Rivera of the Susquehanna Regional Police Department (Affidavit), on March

10, 2023, police received a report that Respondent inappropriately touched a 14-year-old student during an Introduction to Wood Working class. PDE Ex. 1 at 5.

16. According to the Affidavit, the student started Respondent's class on January 19, 2023. PDE Ex. 1 at 5.

17. According to the Affidavit, Respondent had touched the student four (4) times previously on his shoulders. PDE Ex. 1 at 5.

18. According to the Affidavit, the student told Respondent not to touch him and that he did not like being touched. PDE Ex. 1 at 5.

19. According to the Affidavit, Ms. Learn, an emotional support teacher, witnessed Respondent touch the student on the shoulder and had a conversation with Respondent about not touching the student. Respondent allegedly told Ms. Learn that "he wouldn't touch him anymore." PDE Ex. 1 at 5.

20. According to the Affidavit, during class on March 10, 2023, the student was preparing his wood project and needed help getting another board, at which time Respondent walked the student to the wood storage locker that was located towards the rear of the classroom. PDE Ex. 1 at 5.

21. According to the Affidavit, when the student and Respondent were about halfway to the wood storage locker, Respondent again put his hand on the student's shoulder, but this time ran his fingers down the student's back to his buttocks and squeezed the student's buttocks. PDE Ex. 1 at 5.

22. According to the Affidavit, the student quickly turned and said, "You touched my

butt,” to which Respondent replied, “I’m sorry, I’m sorry,” while fidgeting with his fingers. PDE Ex. 1 at 5.

23. According to the Affidavit, Respondent initially hesitated when the student asked to go to the Emotional Support classroom but eventually relented because the student had a pass that allows him to go there as needed. PDE Ex. 1 at 5.

24. According to the Affidavit, the student entered the Emotional Support classroom visibly upset, escalated and shaking, and refused to return to Respondent’s classroom. PDE Ex. 1 at 5.

25. On August 22, 2023, a preliminary hearing was held before Magisterial District Judge Randal Miller, after which the charges were held for court. PDE Ex. 1 at 11-12.

26. The charges remain pending in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas at docket number CP-36-CR-0003711-2023. PDE Ex. 1 at 8-10.

27. Respondent is on unpaid leave pending disposition of the criminal charges. N.T. at 33; Respondent Exhibit C.

#### Conclusions of Law

1. The Commission has jurisdiction in this matter. 24 P.S. § 2070.5.
2. Respondent has been afforded reasonable notice of hearing and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the Administrative Agency Law. 2 Pa.C.S. § 504.
3. The Department has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent was indicted for crimes set forth in section 1-111(e)(1) of the Public School Code of 1949.

4. The Department has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent poses a threat to the health, safety, or welfare of students or other persons in the schools of the Commonwealth.
5. Respondent is subject to discipline under the Educator Discipline Act. 24 P.S. § 2070.9b(a)(1).

#### Discussion

Section 9b(a)(1) of the Educator Discipline Act (Act) requires the Commission to order the immediate suspension of an educator who is indicted<sup>1</sup> for a crime set forth in section 111(e)(1) through (3) of the Public School Code of 1949, if the Commission determines that the educator “poses a threat to the health, safety or welfare of students or other persons in the schools of this Commonwealth.” 24 P.S. § 2070.9b(a)(1). The Department bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, both that the educator has been indicted for an enumerated crime and that the educator poses a threat of harm to the health, safety or welfare of students or other persons in the schools. As we detailed in Department of Education v. Sean D. Minnich, PSPC Docket No. DI-16-031, the determination whether the immediate suspension of an educator’s certificate and employment eligibility is warranted involves a three-step process. First, the Department can meet the first prong, *i.e.*, can show that an educator has been charged with an enumerated crime, by presenting court documents, *e.g.*, an indictment. Second, the allegations underlying the criminal charges may serve as a basis to show that an educator poses the requisite threat of harm. Finally, the educator is afforded the opportunity to present evidence as to why the charges and underlying

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1. The term indictment includes a bill of indictment, police criminal complaint, criminal information or other similar document. 24 P.S. § 2070.1b.

allegations do not establish reasonable cause to believe that he or she poses a threat of harm to students or others.

Here, the Department has presented the Commission with certified court documents showing that Respondent has been charged in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania with Unlawful Contact with Minor, Corruption of Minors and Indecent Assault, which are crimes set forth in section 111(e)(1) of the Public School Code of 1949. 24 P.S. § 1-111(e)(1). Respondent admits that he has been so charged. Therefore, the Department has satisfied the first prong of its two-prong burden.

Regarding the second prong, the court records show that Respondent is accused of rubbing a 14-year-old male student's shoulder, running his hand down the student's back, and squeezing the student's buttocks for sexual gratification. The alleged assault occurred after Respondent purportedly touched the victim on the shoulder four times and was warned by both the victim and another educator that he did not like being touched and not to touch him. Following the alleged assault, the victim was reportedly upset, escalated and shaking, and refused to return to Respondent's classroom. The Department argues that the criminal complaint's allegations, combined with the district court's finding that probable cause exists to believe that Respondent committed the acts charged, support a finding that Respondent poses a threat to the health, safety or welfare of students or others in a school.

In response, Respondent first argues that the Commission's three-step process cannot be applied in this case due to the hearing officer's decision to exclude objected to hearsay statements contained in the Affidavit of Probable Cause. Without those statements, Respondent argues, there is no evidence showing what led police to charge



Respondent. This argument is without merit. First, the Commission is “the ultimate fact finder, with the authority to affirm, reverse, or modify the hearing officer’s decision as well as to impose discipline accordingly.” Gow v. Department of Educ., Prof’l Stds. & Practices Comm’n, 763 A.2d 528, 532 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000); Boguslawski v. Dep’t of Educ., 837 A.2d 614, 618 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). As such, the Commission is “empowered to substitute its own independent judgment instead of deferring to the judgment of the hearing officer.” Id. More importantly, Respondent’s argument misconstrues the hearing officer’s ruling, and ignores the purpose for which the certified court documents were offered. In response to Respondent’s hearsay objection, the hearing officer did not, as Respondent asserts, exclude the statements contained in the Affidavit of Probable Cause.<sup>2</sup> Rather, the hearing officer admitted the Department’s Exhibit 1 in its entirety, including the Affidavit, while simply observing that “the specific allegations [in the Affidavit of Probable Cause] would be hearsay as far as what the investigating individual stated, unless that person is going to be testifying...” N.T. at 11. Those allegations are hearsay, however, only if offered for their truth. See Pa.R.E. 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’ means a statement that (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”). It is axiomatic that “[a] statement that is not offered for its truth...is not hearsay.” Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 124 A.3d 1229, 1244 (Pa. 2015). Here, the record reflects that the Affidavit of Probable Cause was offered by the Department as proof of the reason why Respondent was criminally charged. It was not offered for the truth of the statements contained in the Affidavit.

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2. To the extent that the hearing officer’s ruling can be interpreted as excluding the statements, it is reversed.

N.T. at 11. The Commission has repeatedly stated that the allegations underlying the criminal charges may serve as sufficient support for a finding that the educator poses the requisite threat to justify the suspension of the educator's certificate pending disposition of the criminal charges. The truth of those allegations is immaterial because the Commission makes no assertion about the educator's guilt or innocence of the charges alleged in the indictment. Accordingly, as the Affidavit of Probable Cause was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, it cannot be characterized as hearsay. It is admissible to establish the allegations undergirding the charges for the purpose of determining whether Respondent poses a threat. Finally, Respondent's assertion that his hearsay objection leaves only "abstract charges" for the Commission to consider is simply untrue. Respondent's own witness confirmed that the allegation reported to the District, CYS and the police was that Respondent "touched the student on the shoulder and then touched his buttocks." N.T. at 23.

Respondent next contends to the extent the three-step process applies it should be disregarded as violative of his rights under the plain language of the Act and Section 504 of the Administrative Agency Law. He argues that because the educator is barred from challenging the credibility and truthfulness of the allegations in the indictment, the Commission's three-step process is fundamentally unfair and renders the opportunity to be heard meaningless. The essence of Respondent's argument is that in order to sustain its burden of proving he poses a threat, the Department must prove the allegations underlying the criminal charges before the courts have even had a chance to determine his guilt or innocence. Because neither the Act nor due process requires a

full adversarial hearing on the merits of the criminal charges, Respondent's argument must fail.

### *The Act*

Before the Commission can order an immediate suspension pursuant to section 9b(a)(1) of the Act, the Commission must determine that the educator poses a threat to the health, safety or welfare of students or other persons in the schools of this Commonwealth. The Commission is required to hold a hearing, if requested by the educator, to consider facts relevant to that determination. 24 P.S. § 2070.9b(a)(1). The statute is silent with respect to the contours of the required hearing. However, the Commission has repeatedly stated that an indictment alone can satisfy both prongs of the Department's burden because the indictment is an "objective fact" that must be based upon probable cause to believe the educator committed the acts charged.<sup>3</sup> Dep't of Educ. v. Minnich, PSPC Docket No. DI-16-031, at 3, fn. 3; *See also* Dep't of Educ. v. Deppen, PSPC Docket No. DI-10-03, at 4 (a formal judicial determination by a district magistrate that probable cause exists to believe that an individual has committed the acts charged may serve as sufficient support for the Commission's finding that there is reasonable cause to suspend). Reading section 9b(a)(1) in the context of the Act as a whole supports this interpretation. First, the Act does not allow a suspension based

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3. In Pennsylvania, a person accused of a crime has a right to a preliminary hearing. Commonwealth ex rel. Fitzpatrick v. Mirarchi, 392 A.2d 1346 (1978). The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to prevent a person from being imprisoned or required to post bail for a crime that was not committed or with which there is no evidence of his connection. Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 173, 174 (Pa. 1990). At the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth has the burden of producing legally competent evidence "which demonstrates the existence of each of the material elements of the crime charged and legally competent evidence to demonstrate the existence of facts which connect accused to the crime charged. Id. In this matter, the charges filed against Respondent were held for court following a preliminary hearing.

upon the filing of any type of criminal complaint. Rather, only an indictment for a crime so serious the educator would be permanently barred from school employment upon conviction will support a suspension under section 9b(a)(1).<sup>4</sup> Thus, an indictment supported by probable cause should certainly be sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption the educator poses a threat. Second, section 9b(a)(1) requires the Commission to hold a hearing within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the request for a hearing and to issue a decision within twenty (20) days of the conclusion of the hearing. 24 P.S. § 2070.9b(a)(1)(i). Clearly, the legislature intended to provide an expedient method to suspend an educator's certificate and employment eligibility. Requiring a full-blown administrative hearing at which the Department must prove the allegations underlying the indictment before an educator can be suspended would clearly run counter to the legislative purpose. Had the legislature intended such a result, there would have been no need to carve out a special provision for educators charged with certain offenses because it could have simply required the Department to bring a case under sections 9c and 13 of the Act. See 24 P.S. § 2070.9c (relating to imposition of discipline on other grounds) and 24 P.S. § 2070.13 (relating to hearing). Finally, an immediate suspension under section 9b(a)(1) is clearly intended as a temporary measure to protect students and others in a school while the *courts* determine the educator's culpability. If the educator is convicted, his or her certificate will be revoked. See 24 P.S. § 2070.9b(a)(2). If the educator is acquitted or the criminal charges are otherwise removed, the educator will be immediately reinstated. 24 P.S. §

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4. Section 111 of the Public School Code of 1949 disqualifies from school employment anyone who has been convicted of any of the offenses enumerated in subsections (e)(1)-(3).

2070.9b(a)(1)(iii). If, the Department believes that despite the acquittal or dismissal, the educator's alleged conduct is sufficient to warrant discipline, it must bring a new proceeding and the educator is entitled to a full-blown administrative hearing at which the Department must prove that the conduct actually occurred. 24 P.S. § 2070.9b(b); 24 P.S. § 2070.13. Therefore, direct evidence of Respondent's wrongdoing at the immediate suspension stage would be superfluous because the educator's guilt or innocence is not at issue. The only issue is whether the educator poses a threat.

#### *Due Process*

The Commission's interpretation is also consistent with principles of due process. The essential elements of due process are notice and opportunity to be heard. Soja v. Pennsylvania State Police, 455 A.2d 613, 615 (Pa. 1982). This procedural due process requirement is codified in the Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law, which provides, "No adjudication of a Commonwealth agency shall be valid as to any party unless he shall have been afforded reasonable notice of a hearing and an opportunity to be heard." 2 Pa.C.S. § 504. "Further, due process is a 'flexible' concept, not a technical one, and it imposes only such procedural safeguards as the situation warrants." Fountain Capital Fund, Inc. v. Pa. Secs. Comm'n, 948 A.2d 208, 214 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (citations omitted). The amount of process that is due in any particular circumstance must be determined by application of the three-part balancing test first established in Mathews v. Eldridge. This balancing test considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the governmental action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation together with the value of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the state interest involved, including the administrative burden the additional or substitute

procedural requirements would impose on the state. Friends of Devito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 897 (Pa. 2020); *citing* Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); See *also* Firman v. State Board of Medicine, 697 A.2d 291 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).

In this case, the private interest is Respondent's property right in the practice of the teaching profession. It is well-settled that a teaching certificate is a constitutionally protected property right entitled to due process protection. Bowalick v. Commonwealth, Department of Education, 840 A.2d 519, 522 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). The protections given to the right to practice a profession are, however, "subject to the lawful exercise of the power of the State to protect the public health, safety, welfare, and morals by promulgating laws and regulations that reasonably regulate occupations." Khan v. State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam'rs, 842 A.2d 936, 946 (Pa. 2004).

The risk of an erroneous deprivation of Respondent's interest is negligible because the "objective fact" of the indictment is sufficiently reliable to provide an adequate basis for the suspension in that an independent third party has determined that there is probable cause to believe Respondent committed a serious crime. Moreover, the fact that an indictment is considered adequate evidence does not, as Respondent argues, render the hearing meaningless. That's because the indictment is not conclusive. The filing of charges will support a finding of threat of harm in some cases but not in others depending upon the specific allegations set forth in the indictment.<sup>5</sup> Finally, as noted above, the educator has an opportunity to present

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5. In Department of Education v. R.L., PSPC Docket No. DI-19-177, the Commission emphasized that a threat will not be presumed from the mere filing of charges and found the Department's argument wanting where the educator was charged with Endangering the Welfare of Children based upon allegations she left her six-year-old son home alone for approximately two and-a-half hours while she was drinking and eating at a neighbor's house.

evidence on why a suspension is not warranted. For these reasons it is unlikely that any particular suspension would be erroneously imposed.

Finally, while the private interest is substantial, the Commission has a paramount interest that is served by the current process, namely removing educators who may constitute a threat to the health, safety or welfare of the students, the teachers or the school and in preserving the integrity of the profession. Petron v. Department of Education, 726 A.2d at 1091,1094; Bowalick, 840 A.2d at 522-3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). The only alternative to allowing suspension on the basis of the indictment is to require the Department to conduct a mini-trial to prove independently that the educator committed the crime(s) with which he or she has been charged. Such a procedure would impose a substantial burden on the Department and undermine the purpose of the law, which is to protect children and others in a school from the alleged perpetrator during the pendency of the litigation so as not to allow them to be subject to the crimes involved. Petron, 726 A.2d at 1095 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (Pellegrini, J. concurring). Practically speaking, the Department is not a criminal justice agency and cannot compel access to police reports and other evidence that may be necessary to prove the underlying allegations. Moreover, a hearing on the merits of the criminal charges would also constitute an improper interference with the criminal proceedings and raise a number of issues for the affected educator, including Fifth Amendment issues. For these reasons, and also because the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest is negligible, the three-step process articulated by the Commission satisfies due process.

In the present case, the record reflects that Respondent was afforded the statutorily required predeprivation hearing before a neutral hearing examiner where he was represented by counsel and given the opportunity to rebut the Department's evidence. Therefore, the record demonstrates that Respondent received all the process he was due.

### *Respondent's Evidence*

Finally, Respondent argues that he proved he does not pose a threat by introducing evidence he was returned to the classroom following investigations by the District and CYS and that he voluntarily agreed not to return to his position at the District until the criminal case is resolved. The Commission concludes that Respondent's evidence is insufficient to rebut the Department's evidence that he poses a threat. While Principal Haldeman testified that CYS determined the allegations to be unfounded, he admitted he does not know what the investigation consisted of or the reasons for the unfounded determination. Furthermore, Principal Haldeman's own investigation consisted of speaking only to adults. He did not interview the alleged victim. He also did not testify that his investigation disproved the allegations. Rather, when asked about his findings, Principal Haldeman simply testified, "[W]e had what [Respondent] reported and what the student reported, and their stories were different. So that's the information that we gathered from that event." Moreover, the District has placed Respondent on unpaid leave pending the outcome of the criminal charges, an action that belies any implication the District does not consider Respondent to be a threat. Finally, the agreement referenced by Respondent only precludes him from returning to his position at the District. It does not preclude him from seeking



employment in another District or outside the Commonwealth. Respondent argues that the laws requiring educators to report certain arrests to their employer and school entities to conduct pre-employment background checks make it impossible for him to work while the charges are pending absent gross negligence by a hiring district. However, as noted by the Department, the efficacy of those laws depends upon educators accurately reporting their employment and criminal history and school entities exercising proper judgment and due diligence in the hiring process. It also bears mentioning that none of the laws cited by Respondent prevent a school entity from hiring an educator who is facing criminal charges. Therefore, the Commission is simply unwilling to let school safety rest on Respondent's voluntary agreement.

#### Conclusion

Based upon the totality of the evidence, the Commission finds that the Department has met its burden of proving that Respondent poses a threat to the health, safety, or welfare of students or other individuals in a school. Accordingly, the Commission will direct the Department to immediately suspend his certificate and employment eligibility.

#### Order

AND NOW, this 13<sup>th</sup> day of March 2024, upon consideration of the Department of Education's Notice of Charges requesting immediate suspension and Respondent's response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. The Department is directed to immediately suspend Respondent's certificate and eligibility to be employed as a charter or cyber charter school staff member or contracted educational provider staff member pursuant to 24 P.S. §

2070.9b(a)(1).

2. Respondent is not eligible to be employed in a school entity in a position requiring certification or as a charter or cyber charter school staff member or contracted educational provider staff member, or eligible for any certificate.
3. If the criminal charges are dismissed or if Respondent is acquitted, the Commission will direct the Department to immediately lift the suspension of Respondent's certificate and employment eligibility upon receipt of the appropriate documentation. 24 P.S. § 2070.9b(a)(1)(iii).
4. An appeal of this Order shall not operate as a stay of the discipline imposed. 24 P.S. § 2070.15(b)(3).

PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND  
PRACTICES COMMISSION

By:



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Myron Yoder  
Chairperson Pro Tempore

ATTEST:



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Shane F. Crosby  
Executive Director

Date Mailed: March 13, 2024